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# DE AMICITIA

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
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO

WITH

LIFE OF THE AUTHOR, TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION, AND  
BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY,

BY

MARY E. VAUGHAN



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# LIFE OF CICERO.

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The great Roman orator and statesman, Marcus Tullius Cicero, was born Jan. 3, 106 B. C., in the vicinity of Arpinum, a town about fifty miles east of Rome. The father of Cicero was an amiable, book-loving, country gentleman, with seemingly no ambition, but for his two sons, to both of whom he gave every opportunity for making the most of themselves in the world. The two brothers displayed such an aptitude for learning that their father removed with them to Rome, where they received instructions from the best teachers in the capital. The names of many masters have been given us under whom Cicero was educated. One of the most celebrated was the Greek poet, Archias, of Antioch, who, like many other educated Greeks of that day, made his way to Rome. What Cicero owed to him we do not know, but to Cicero Archias owes immortality. His claim to citizenship was disputed; and Cicero, pleading on his behalf, made one of those shorter speeches which is perfect in melody, in taste, and in language. In a certain passage, speaking on behalf of so excellent a profession in the art, he sings the praises of literature generally: "Other recreations," he says, "do not belong to all seasons, nor to all ages, nor to all places. These pursuits nourish our youth and delight our old age. They adorn our prosperity, and give a refuge and a solace to our

troubles. They charm us at home and are not in our way when we are abroad." Archias probably did something for Cicero in directing his taste, and richly did Cicero reward him.

At sixteen Cicero went through the ceremony of putting off his boy's dress, the *toga praetexta*, and appearing in the *toga virilis* before the praetor, thus assuming his right to go about a man's business. When this was done, he studied under Scaevola, pontifex maximus, and in later years during the Civil War, under Phædrus, the Epicurean, Philo, chief of the new Academy, Diototus, the Stoic, and Molo, the Rhodian. Having carefully cultivated his powers, Cicero began his career as a pleader in the forum. His first extant speech was delivered when he was twenty-six, in behalf of P. Quintius. The next year he defended Roscius of Ameria, charged with parricide by a freedman of Sulla. In 79 he went to Greece, partly that he might avoid Sulla, whom he had offended, but partly also that he might improve his health and complete his studies. At Athens he formed that friendship with Pomponius Atticus which lasted until his death. It was to this rich Roman gentleman, long resident in Greece, that half of the eight hundred letters of Cicero, which have come down to us, were written. To the preservation of his private letters written with inimitable *naivete*, and in the most charming style, is due the fact that we know so well the details of Cicero's life today. After a delightful year of travel and study in Greece, he inquired of the Delphic oracle whether he should devote his life (he was then twenty-nine), to literature or to politics.

The answer was worded with the customary ingenuity of the oracle "Follow Nature and take not the opinion of the multitude for the guide of your life." In whichever way the inquirer interpreted it, he returned to Rome, and plunged into that exciting career of the law-courts and the forum, where he had already made a name, and where, for a full generation to come, he was to play so prominent a part. Before his return to Rome he visited Asia and the Isle of Rhodes. He conversed with Xenocles, of Adramyttium; Dionysius, of Magnesia, and Menippus, of Caria; at Rhodes, he studied oratory with Apollonius and philosophy with Posidonius. Apollonius, not understanding Latin, requested Cicero to declaim in Greek. He complied willingly, thinking that his faults would thus be better pointed out to him. When he had finished, all were loud in praise, and Apollonius said, "You have my praise and admiration, Cicero, and Greece my pity and commiseration, since those arts and that eloquence which are the only glories that remain to her, will now be transferred by you to Rome." With health firmly established and oratorical powers greatly improved, he soon obtained the highest distinction, and his success in the forum paved the way to all the great political offices, each of which he held in succession. At thirty-two he was quaestor at Lilybaeum in Sicily and managed the finances of that beautiful and much-plundered province with such wisdom and fairness as thoroughly to endear himself to its inhabitants, and to secure, at the same time, the dislike of those patricians at Rome, of whose practice his fairness was an implied censure. Two years later, after

his election to the ædileship of the next year (an office which conferred the superintendence of the public buildings of Rome, and the regulation of certain great games and shows), Cicero revisited Sicily to collect evidence against Verres, whom he had himself impeached for his gross mal-administration as governor of the island. Verres was convicted, and the grateful Sicilians brought Cicero all sorts of presents which he used to reduce the public price of provisions, and not for his own profit.

In his thirtieth year he was married to Terentia, a lady of fortune and family. Their two children, a daughter Tullia, and a son Marcus, have a prominent place in those charming letters to Atticus. "*Tulliola deliciolae nostrae*,"—My little darling of a Tullia's name occurs in almost every one of the early letters; and the deepest joy, and, alas! the keenest sorrow of the father's life were latent, had he but known it, in these words. It was his irritable fastidiousness in money matters which led Cicero to divorce his wife Terentia, with whom he had lived comfortably for thirty years, and to whom he was writing freely and affectionately up to the very eve of the sad event. He discovered that, during his mournful year of exile she had not only been speculating freely,—as many Roman ladies did in those days,—but that she had been in league with a former slave of theirs, to cheat him out of large sums. His wrath was naturally high, and his remedy was at hand. In a society where divorce was of daily occurrence, there is no wonder that the remedy was promptly applied. Cicero's standards were probably lax enough in some respects, compared with those of our day, but the taint of pecu-

niary meanness and indirection was one which he could not and would not tolerate. He married not long after a young and beautiful woman, but his domestic happiness was at an end, as shortly after this marriage his beloved Tullia died in her husband's house. The philosophers from all parts came to comfort the heart broken father, for his grief was so excessive that he put away his newly married wife because she seemed to be pleased at the death of Tullia. Here we see his weakness and strength. He was changeful and vain, but loving and upright.

Cicero's greatest work as a statesman was the suppression of the conspiracy of Cataline, which broke out during his consulship and was crushed by his prudence and energy. For this service he received the highest honors; he was called the "Father of his Country," and thanksgivings in his name were voted to the gods. But as soon as he had laid down his consulship he had to contend with the friends of the conspirators whose death he had decreed. His mortal enemy Clodius brought forward a bill banishing any one who should be found to have put to death a Roman citizen untried. The triumvirs, Cæsar, Pompey and Crassus, left Cicero to his fate. Cicero's courage failed him; he voluntarily retired from Rome before the measure of Clodius was put to the vote, and crossed over to Greece. Here he gave way to excessive grief and unmanly despair. And yet he had often desired his friends not to call him orator but philosopher, because he had made philosophy his business, and had only used oratory as an instrument for attaining his objects in public life! Meanwhile his

friends at Rome were exerting themselves in his behalf and obtained his recall from banishment in the course of the next year. Though he was recalled with every mark of honor, it was to find orderly government at an end. The magnificent defence of Milo was his last protest against the reign of force that daily became more imminent in Rome. The two following years he served as Proconsul in Cilicia, and returned to find all things ripe for civil war. Pompey became leader of the conservative party, and after trying in vain to reconcile Pompey and Cæsar, leader of the popular party, Cicero cast his fortunes with Pompey in the fatal campaign of Pharsalia (B. C. 48). Cæsar not only pardoned Cicero, but upon landing at Brundisium, in Sept., 47, he greeted him with great kindness and respect, and allowed him to return to Rome. Cicero now retired from public life, and it was during these three or four years preceding the assassination of Cæsar that all the moral and philosophical treatises, the *Tusculanae*, the essays on Friendship and Old Age, were produced. Cicero was not a party to that conspiracy which was consummated on the ides of March (B. C. 44), but its perpetrators appealed to him first for applause when the deed was done, and they did not appeal in vain. For a brief period he seems to have been deluded by the belief that the idea of his life was vindicated, the republic regenerated, and her wrongs avenged. Then the populace veered; the conspirators were paralyzed; the elements of the second triumvirate made their sinister appearance. Brutus and Cassius with their handful of aristocratic adherents, withdrew to Greece to meet their fate at Phil-

ippi. Cicero, who had been considering the question of accompanying them, and who joined them for a single night at Velia, turned back at the earnest persuasion of Brutus himself, to make one more attempt to revive the dying republican cause at Rome. Whether or no, Cicero in by-gone days had played the craven, there was no question of his daring now. He attacked Antony in those terrible Philippics which later proved his ruin. He tried to see in "young Octavius," the rising star of the old Roman party. He tried to win Cæsar's young and comely nephew, and to mould him into the sorely-needed patriot leader. We now know that it was all in vain, that Antony defied and Octavius betrayed him. He himself suspected it would be so in the rare moments when the brave old patriot allowed himself to despond. "We have killed the king," he would then say bitterly, "but the kingdom is with us still. We have taken away the tyrant; the tyranny survives." It was not given to Cicero to stem the tide of imperialism, but the nature of his life, the dreams of a pure republic which he cherished, those aspirations have not utterly perished. All had now departed which had made life rich and dear to Cicero. He met his end with quiet courage. Plutarch has painted well that last scene. We see him "with hair and beard disordered, and weary countenance, taking his chin in his left hand, with the old familiar gesture, and looking fixedly at his murderers." He was slain by the soldiers of Octavius near Formiæ, when he had nearly completed his sixty-fourth year. Rome heard the news with ill-suppressed lamentation. With all his faults, he was an honorable

man, "who loved his country," as Augustus himself said in a moment of frankness and remorse.

It will be conceded by those who know the character of Cicero best that public life did not suit him. The very reasons which made him an incomparable writer did not permit him to be a statesman. His fertile imagination rendered him hardly capable of connected plans. No greater master of composition and of the music of speech has ever come among us. His style has been the model of succeeding ages. His writings are valuable not only as models of exquisite Latin, but they are rich in materials for a history of his time. They may be divided into the following subjects: I. Rhetorical works. Of these there were seven which have come down to us more or less complete. The best known of these is the "De Oratore," written at the request of his brother Quintus; it is the most perfect of his rhetorical works. II. The Philosophical Works. Under the head of Political Philosophy, we have the "De Republica" and "De Legibus," both of which are written in the form of a dialogue. A large portion of both works is preserved. His works, "De Officiis," "De Senectute," and "De Amicitia," may be classed as Philosophy of Morals. The most noted of his writings, "De Finibus," or inquiry into "the chief good," and the "Tusculan Disputations" may come under the head of Speculative Philosophy. In the "De Natura Deorum" he gives an account of the speculations of the ancients concerning a divine Being—these are continued in the "De Divinatione." III. Orations. Of these fifty-six have come down to us. IV. Epistles.



Cicero, during the most important period of his life, maintained a close correspondence with Atticus and with a wide circle of literary and political friends and connections. We now have upwards of eight hundred letters undoubtedly genuine, extending over a period of twenty-six years, and commonly arranged under "Epistolae ad Familiares s. ad Adversos," "Ad Atticum" and "Ad Quintum Fratrem." In Cicero's essays is to be found always a perfect withdrawal of himself from the circumstances of the world around him; so that the reader is led to suppose that in the evening of his life, having reached at last, by means of work done for the State, a time of blessed rest, he gives forth the wisdom of his age, surrounded by all that a tranquil world can give. The man who, after nearly half a century of friendship, could write to his friend such an essay as "De Amicitia" cannot have been an unhappy man. There is not a precept taught in it which is not universal, belonging to all times and all places.

Cicero no doubt was a pagan, but a pagan who could say of eternity: "There is certainly a place in heaven where the blessed shall enjoy eternal life;" of immortality—"Are we all of us so poor in spirit as to think that after toiling for our country and ourselves—though we have not had one moment of ease here upon earth—when we die all things shall die with us?" He said of virtue—"You shall put your hope neither in man's opinions nor in human rewards; but Virtue itself by her own charms shall lead you the way to glory." He thus tells us his idea of God's omnipotence: "This force they call the soul of the world, and looking on it

as perfect in intelligence and wisdom, they name it their God." And again he says, speaking of God's care, "Who is there, when he thinks that a God is taking care of him, shall not live day and night in awe of his divine majesty." As to man's duty to his neighbor, a subject on which people, before and since the time of Cicero, have not always had clear ideas, the treatise "De Officiis" is full of it, as indeed is the whole course of his life. "All duty which tends to protect the society of man with men is to be preferred to that of which science is the simple object." Thus we see this Roman, who lived so long ago, still teaching and delighting man with the truth, the "fountain of an energy that goes pulsing on with waves of benefit to the borders of society, to the circumference of things."

## DE AMICITIA.

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QUINTUS MUCIUS, the augur, used to relate many things of Caius Lælius, his father-in-law, from memory and in a pleasant manner, and did not scruple in every discourse to call him a wise man. Moreover, I myself, after assuming the manly toga, was introduced by my father to Scævola, in such a way that, as far as I could and it was permitted me, I never quitted the old man's side. Accordingly, many sagacious discussions of his, and many short and apt sayings, I committed to memory, and desired to become better informed by his wisdom. When he died I betook myself to Scævola, the pontiff, who is the only man in our country that I venture to pronounce the most distinguished for talent and for integrity. But of him elsewhere. I now return to the augur. Among many other circumstances, I remember that once being seated at home in his arm-chair (as was his custom), when I was in his company, and a very few of his intimate friends, he fell by chance upon that subject of discourse which at the time was in the mouth of nearly every one; for you of course remember Atticus, and the more so because you were very intimate with Publius Sulpicius (when he, as trib-

une of the people, was estranged by a deadly hatred from Quintus Pompey, who was then consul, with whom up to that time he had lived on terms of the closest union and affection), how great was the surprise and even regret of the people. Accordingly, when Scævola had incidentally mentioned that very subject, he laid before us the discourse of Lælius on Friendship, which had been addressed by the latter to himself and to the other son-in-law of Lælius, Caius Fannius, the son of Marcus, a few days after the death of Africanus. The opinions of that disquisition I committed to memory, and in this book I have set them forth according to my own judgment. For I have introduced the individuals as if actually speaking, lest "said I" and "said he" should be too frequently interposed; and that the dialogue might seem to be held by persons face to face. For when you were frequently urging me to write something on the subject of friendship, it seemed to me a matter worthy as well of the consideration of all as of our intimacy. I have therefore willingly done so, that I might confer a benefit on many in consequence of your request. But as in the Cato Major, which was addressed to you on the subject of old age, I have introduced Cato when an old man conversing, because there seemed no person better adapted to speak of that period of life than he, who had been an old man for so long a time, and in that old age had been pre-eminently

prosperous; so when I heard from our ancestors that the attachment of Caius Lælius and Publius Scipio was especially worthy of record, the character of Lælius seemed to me a suitable one to deliver these very observations on friendship which Scævola remembered to have been spoken by him. Now this description of discourses, resting on the authority of men of old, and of those of high rank, seems, I know not on what principle, to carry with it the greater weight. Accordingly, while I am reading my own writing, I am sometimes so much affected as to suppose that it is Cato, and not myself that is speaking. But as then I, an old man, wrote to you, who are an old man, on the subject of old age, so in this book I myself, a most sincere friend, have written to a friend on the subject of friendship. On that occasion Cato was the speaker, than whom there was no one at that time older or wiser. On this, Lælius, not only a wise man (for so he has been considered), and one pre-eminent in reputation for friendship, speaks on that subject. I would wish you to withdraw your thoughts a little while from me, and fancy that Lælius himself is speaking. Caius Fannius and Quintus Mucius come to their father-in-law after the death of Africanus. With these the discourse begins. Lælius replies; and the whole of his dissertation regards friendship, which in reading you will discover for yourself.

FANNIUS. Such is the case, dear Lælius, nor was there ever a better or more distinguished man than Africanus. But you ought to consider that the eyes of all are now turned upon you, Lælius; you alone they both denominate and believe to be wise. This character was lately bestowed on M. Cato; we know that Lucius Atilius, among our fathers, was entitled a wise man; but each on a different and peculiar account; Atilius, because he was considered versed in the civil law; Cato, because he had experience in a variety of subjects; both in the senate and in the forum many instances are recorded either of his shrewd forethought or persevering action, or pointed reply; wherefore he already had, as it were, the surname of wise in his old age. While of you it is remarked that you are wise in a different sense, not only by nature and character, but further, by application and learning; and not as the vulgar, but as the learned designate a wise man, such as was none in all Greece. For as those who are called the seven wise men, persons who inquire into such things with great nicety, do not consider them in the class of wise men. We learn that at Athens there was one peculiarly so, and that he was even pronounced by the oracle of Apollo the wisest of men. This is the kind of wisdom they conceive to be in you, that you consider every thing connected with you to rest upon yourself, and

consider the events of life as subordinate to virtue; therefore, they inquire of me (I believe of you also, Scævola), in what manner you bear the death of Africanus. And the rather so, because on the last nones, when we had come into the gardens of Decius Brutus, the augur, for the purpose of discussion, as our practice is, you were not present; although you were accustomed most punctually to observe that day and that engagement.

SCÆVOLA. It is true, many are inquiring, Caius Lælius, as has been asserted by Fannius. But for my part, I answer them according to what I have remarked, that you bear with patience the grief which you have suffered by the death of one who was at once a very distinguished man and a very dear friend; yet that you could not forbear being distressed, nor would that have been consistent with your feelings as a man. And with regard to your not having attended last nones at our assembly, ill-health was the cause, and not affliction.

LÆLIUS. You certainly said what was right, Scævola, and agreeable to truth; for neither ought I to have absented myself through any inconvenience of mine from that duty which I have always fulfilled when I was well, nor by any chance do I conceive it can happen to a man of firmness of character that any interruption should take place in his duty. And as for you, Fannius, who say there is attributed to me so much

merit, as I am neither conscious of nor lay claim to, you act therein like a friend; but, as it seems to me, you do not form a right estimate of Cato, for either there never has been a wise man, which I rather think, or if there ever was one, he was the man. For (to omit other cases) consider how he endured the loss of his son. I remember the instance of Paullus, and witnessed that of Gallus; but theirs was in the case of children; but Cato's is that of a mature and respected man. Wherefore pause before you prefer to Cato, even him whom Apollo, as you say, pronounced the wisest of men: for the deeds of the one are praised, but only the sayings of the other. Concerning myself, however (for I would now address you both), entertain the following sentiments:

Should I say that I am not distressed by the loss of Scipio, philosophers may determine with what propriety I should do so; but assuredly I should be guilty of falsehood. For I am distressed at being bereaved of such a friend, as no one, I consider, will ever be to me again, and, as I can confidently assert, no one ever was; but I am not destitute of a remedy. I comfort myself, and especially with this consolation, that I am free from that error by which most men, on the decease of friends, are wont to be tormented; for I feel that no evil has happened to Scipio; it has befallen myself, if indeed it has happened to any. Now to be above measure distressed



at one's own troubles, is characteristic of the man who loves not his friend, but himself. In truth, as far as he is concerned, who can deny that his end was glorious? for unless he had chosen to wish for immortality, of which he had not the slightest thought, what did he fail to obtain which it was lawful for a man to wish for? A man who, as soon as he grew up, by his transcendent merit far surpassed those sanguine hopes of his countrymen which they had conceived regarding him when a mere boy, who never stood for the consulship, yet was made consul twice; on the first occasion before his time; on the second, at the proper age as regarded himself, though for the commonwealth almost too late; who, by overthrowing two cities, most hostile to our empire, put an end, not only to all present, but all future wars. What shall I say of his most engaging manners; of his dutiful conduct to his mother; his generosity to his sisters; his kindness to his friends; his uprightness toward all? These are known to you: and how dear he was to the state, was displayed by its mourning at his death. How, therefore, could the accession of a few years have benefited such a man? For although old age is not burdensome (as I recollect Cato asserted, in conversation with myself and Scipio the year before he died), yet it takes away that freshness which Scipio even yet possessed. Wherefore his life was such that nothing could be added to it, either in respect of good fortune

or of glory: moreover, the very suddenness of his death took away the consciousness of it. On which kind of death it is difficult to pronounce: what men conjecture, you yourselves know. However, this we may assert with truth, that of the many most glorious and joyous days which P. Scipio witnessed in the course of his life, that day was the most glorious when, on the breaking up of the senate, he was escorted home in the evening by the conscript fathers, by the allies of the Roman people, and the Latins, the day before he died; so that from so high a position of dignity he may seem to have passed to the gods above rather than to those below. Nor do I agree with those who have lately begun to assert this opinion, that the soul also dies simultaneously with the body, and that all things are annihilated by death.

The authority of the ancients has more weight with me, either that of our own ancestors, who paid such sacred honors to the dead which surely they would not have done if they thought these honors did in no way affect them; or that of those who once lived in this country, and enlightened, by their institutions and instructions, Magna Græcia (which now indeed is entirely destroyed, but then was flourishing); or of him who was pronounced by the oracle of Apollo to be the wisest of men, who did not say first one thing and then another, as is generally done, but always the same; namely, that the souls of men are divine, and that when

they have departed from the body, a return to heaven is opened to them, and the speediest to the most virtuous and just. Which same opinion was also held by Scipio; for he indeed, a very few days before his death, as if he had a presentiment of it, when Philus and Manilius were present, and many others, and you also, Scævola, had gone with me, for three days descanted on the subject of government; of which discussion the last was almost entirely on the immortality of souls, which he said he had learned in sleep through a vision from Africanus. If this be the fact, that the spirit of the best man most easily flies away in death, as from the prison-house and chains of the body; whose passage to the gods can we conceive to have been readier than that of Scipio? Wherefore, to be afflicted at this his departure, I fear, would be the part rather of an envious person than of a friend. But if, on the other hand this be rather the truth, that the death of the soul and of the body is one and the same, and that no consciousness remains; as there is no advantage in death, so certainly there is no evil. For when consciousness is lost, it becomes the same as if he had never been born at all; yet, both we ourselves are glad, and this state as long as it shall exist, will rejoice that he was born. Wherefore (as I said above) with him indeed all ended well; with myself less happily; for it had been more equitable that, as I entered upon life first, I should likewise first depart

from it. But yet I so enjoy the recollection of our friendship, that I seem to have lived happily because I lived with Scipio; with whom I had a common anxiety on public and private affairs, and with whom my life both at home and abroad was associated, and there existed that, wherein consists the entire strength of friendship, an entire agreement of inclinations, pursuits and sentiments. That character for wisdom, therefore, which Fannius a little while ago mentioned, does not so delight me, especially since it is undeserved, as the hope that the recollection of our friendship will last forever. And it is the more gratifying to me, because scarcely in the history of the world are three or four pairs of friends mentioned by name; and I indulge in the hope that the friendship of Scipio and Lælius will be known to posterity in this class.

FANNIUS. Indeed, Lælius, that must be so. But since you have made mention of friendship, and as we have leisure, you will do what is very agreeable to me (I hope also to Scævola), if, as your custom is concerning other matters when your opinion of them is asked, so you would descant on friendship, [telling us] what is your opinion, of what nature you consider it to be, and what direction you would lay down.

SCÆVOLA. To me it will be exceedingly agreeable; and in fact, when I was endeavoring to prevail with you, Fannius anticipated me; wherefore, you will confer a very great favor on both of us.

LÆLIUS. I indeed should not object, if I could feel confidence in myself; for not only is the subject a splendid one, but we, as Fannius said, have nothing to do. But who am I? or what ability is there in me for this? This is the practice of scholars, and of Grecian scholars, that a subject be given them on which they are to dispute, however suddenly. It is a great undertaking, and requires no little practice. Wherefore, as to what may be said on the subject of friendship, I recommend you to seek it from those who profess such things. I can only urge you to prefer friendship to all human possessions; for there is nothing so suited to our nature, so well adapted to prosperity or adversity. But first of all, I am of opinion, that except among the virtuous, friendship can not exist; I do not analyze this principle too closely, as they do who inquire with too great nicety into those things, perhaps, with truth on their side, but with little general advantage; for they maintain that there is no good man but the wise man. Be it so; yet they define wisdom to be such as no mortal has ever attained to; whereas, we ought to contemplate those things which exist in practice and in common life, and not the subjects of fictions or of our own wishes. I would never pretend to say that Caius Fabricius, Marius Curius, and Titus Coruncanius, whom our ancestors esteemed wise, were wise according to the standard of these moralists. Wherefore let them keep to

themselves the name of wisdom, both invidious and unintelligible; and let them allow that these were good men—nay, they will not even do that; they will declare that this can not be granted except to a wise man. Let us therefore proceed with all our dull genius, as they say. Those who so conduct themselves, and so live that their honor, their integrity, their justice, and liberality are approved; so that there is not in them any covetousness, or licentiousness, or boldness; and that they are of great consistency, as those men whom I have mentioned above;—let us consider these worthy of the appellation of good men, as they have been accounted such, because they follow (as far as men are able) nature, which is the best guide of a good life. For I seem to myself to have this view, that we are so formed by nature, that there should be a certain social tie among all; stronger, however, as each approaches nearer to us. Accordingly, citizens are preferable to foreigners, and relations to strangers; for with the latter, nature herself has created a friendly feeling, though this has not sufficient strength. For in this respect friendship is superior to relationship, because from relationship benevolence can be withdrawn, and from friendship it can not; for with the withdrawal of benevolence the very name of friendship is done away, while that of relationship remains. Now how great the power of friendship is, may be best gathered from this consideration, that out of the boundless society

of the human race, which nature herself has joined together, friendship is a matter so contracted, and brought into so narrow a compass, that the whole of affection is confined to two, or at any rate to very few.

Now friendship is nothing else than a complete union of feeling on all subjects, divine and human, accompanied by kindly feeling and attachment; than which, indeed, I am not aware whether, with the exception of wisdom, any thing better has been bestowed on man by the immortal gods. Some men prefer riches, others good health, others influence; others again honors, many prefer even pleasures; the last, indeed, is the characteristic of beasts; while the former are fleeting and uncertain, depending not so much on our own purpose as on the fickleness of fortune. Whereas those who place the supreme good in virtue, therein do admirably; but this very virtue itself both begets and constitutes friendship; nor without this virtue can friendship exist at all. Now let us define this virtue according to the usage of life, and of our common language, and let us not measure it, as certain learned persons do, by pomp of language; and let us include among the good those who are so accounted—the Paulli, the Catos, the Galli, the Scipios, and the Phili; with these men ordinary life is content; and let us pass over those who are nowhere found to exist. Among men of this kind, therefore, friendship finds facilities so great that I can

scarcely describe them. In the first place—to whom can life be “worth living,” as Ennius says, who does not repose on the mutual kind feeling of some friend? What can be more delightful than to have one to whom you can speak on all subjects just as to yourself? Where would be the great enjoyment in prosperity if you had not one to rejoice in it equally with yourself? And adversity would indeed be difficult to endure without some one who would bear it even with greater regret than yourself. In short, all other objects that are sought after are severally suited to some **one** single purpose; riches, that you may spend them; power, that you may be courted; honors, that you may be extolled; pleasures, that you may enjoy them; good health, that you may be exempt from harm, and perform the functions of the body. Whereas friendship comprises the greatest number of objects possible; wherever you turn yourself, it is at hand; shut out of no place, never out of season, never irksome; and therefore we do not use fire and water, as they say, on more occasions than we do friendship. And I am not now speaking of common-place or ordinary friendship (though even that brings delight and benefit), but of real and true friendship, such as belonged to those of whom very few are recorded; for prosperity friendship renders more brilliant, and adversity more supportable, by dividing and communicating it.



And while friendship embraces very many and great advantages, she undoubtedly surpasses all in this, that she shines with a brilliant hope over the future, and never suffers the spirit to be weakened or to sink. Besides, he who looks on a true friend looks, as it were, upon a kind of image of himself; wherefore friends, though absent, are still present; though in poverty, they are rich; though weak, yet in the enjoyment of health; and, what is still more difficult to assert, though dead, they are alive; so entirely does the honor, the memory, the regret of friends attend them; from which circumstance the death of the one seems to be happy, and the life of the other praiseworthy; nay, should you remove from nature the cement of kind feelings, neither a house nor a city will be able to stand; even the cultivation of the land will not continue. If it be not clearly perceived how great is the power of friendship and concord, it can be distinctly inferred from quarrels and dissensions; for what house is there so established, or what state so firmly settled, that may not utterly be overthrown by hatred and dissension? From which it may be determined how much advantage there is in friendship. They relate, indeed, that a certain learned man of Agrigentum promulgated in Greek verses the doctrine that all things which cohere throughout the whole world, and all things that are the subjects of motion, are brought together by friendship, and are dis-

pelled by discord; and this principle all men understand and illustrate by their conduct. Therefore, if at any time any act of a friend has been exhibited, either in undergoing or in sharing dangers, who is there that does not extol such an act with the highest praise? What shouts of applause were lately heard through the whole theater on the occasion of a new play by my guest and friend, Marcus Pacuvius, when the king, being ignorant which of them was Orestes, Pylades said he was Orestes, that he might be put to death instead of him; but Orestes, as was the fact, solemnly maintained that he was the man? They stood up and applauded in an imaginary case; what must we suppose they would have done in a real one? Nature herself excellently asserted her rightful power when men pronounced that to be rightly done in another, which they could not do themselves. Thus far I seem to have been able to lay down what are my sentiments concerning friendship. If anything remains (and I fancy there is much), ask of those, if you please, who practice such discussions.

FANNIUS. But we would rather hear it from you, although I have often asked such questions, and heard their opinions, and that not without satisfaction, yet what we desire is the somewhat different thread of your discourse.

SCÆVOLA. You would say so still more, Fannius, if

you had been present lately in the gardens of Scipio, when the subject of Government was discussed. What an able pleader was he then on the side of justice against the subtle argument of Philus!

FANNIUS. Nay, it was an easy task for the most just of men to uphold the cause of justice.

SCÆVOLA. What shall we say then of friendship? Would it not be easy for him to eulogize it, who, for maintaining it with the utmost fidelity, steadiness, and integrity, has gained the highest glory?

LÆLIUS. Why, this is using force against one: for what matters it by what kind of request you compel me? You, certainly do compel me. For to oppose the wishes of one's sons-in-law, especially in a good matter, is not only hard, but it is not even just. After very often, then, reflecting on the subject of friendship, this question seems to me especially worthy of consideration, whether friendship has become an object of desire, on account of weakness or want, so that by giving and receiving favors, each may receive from another, and mutually repay, what he is himself incapable of acquiring. Or whether this is only a property of friendship; while there is another cause, higher and nobler and more directly derived from nature herself. For love (from which friendship takes its name) is the main motive for the union of kind feelings: for advantages truly are often derived from those who are courted under a pre-

tense of friendship, and have attention paid them for a temporary purpose. In friendship there is nothing false, and nothing pretended; and whatever belongs to it is sincere and spontaneous. Wherefore friendship seems to me to have sprung rather from nature than from a sense of want, and more from an attachment of the mind with a certain feeling of affection, than from a calculation how much advantage it would afford. And of what nature indeed it is, may be observed in the case of certain beasts; for they love their offspring up to a certain time, and are loved by them in such a way that their emotions are easily discovered. And this is much more evident in man. In the first place, from that affection which subsists between children and parents, which can not be destroyed without detestable wickedness: next, where a similar feeling of love has existed, if we have met with any one with whose character and disposition we sympathize, because we appear to discover in him a certain effulgence as it were of integrity and virtue. For nothing is more amiable than virtue, nothing which more strongly allures us to love it, seeing that because of their virtue and integrity we can in a certain degree love those whom we have never seen. Who can mention the name of Caius Fabricius, and Marius Curius, otherwise than with love and affection, though he never saw them? Who can forbear hating Tarquinius Superbus, Spurius Cassius, and Spurius Mælius? Against two

generals we had a struggle for empire in Italy, I mean Pyrrhus and Hannibal; toward the former, on account of his honorable conduct, we bear not a very hostile disposition; while this state will always detest the latter for his cruelty.

Now if such be the influence of integrity, that we love it even in those whom we have never seen, and, what is much more, even in an enemy, what wonder if men's feelings are affected when they seem to discover the goodness and virtue of those with whom they may become connected by intercourse? although love is confirmed by the reception of kindness, and by the discovery of an earnest sympathy, and by close familiarity; which things being added to the first emotion of the mind and the affections, there is kindled a large amount of kindly feeling. And if any imagine that this proceeds from a sense of weakness, so that there shall be secured a friend, by whom a man may obtain that which he wants, they leave to friendship a mean indeed, and, if I may so speak, any thing but respectable origin, when they make her to be born of indigence and want; were this the case, then in proportion as a man judged that there were the least resources in himself, precisely in that degree would he be best qualified for friendship; whereas the fact is far otherwise. For just as a man has most confidence in himself, and as he is most completely fortified by worth and wisdom, so that he needs

no one's assistance, and feels that all his resources reside in himself; in the same proportion he is most highly distinguished for seeking out and forming friendships. For what did Africanus want of me? nothing whatever; nor indeed did I need aught from him: but I loved him from admiration of his excellence; he in turn perhaps was attached to me from some high opinion which he entertained of my character, and association fostered our affection. But although many and great advantages ensued, yet it was not from any hope of these that the cause of our attachment sprang; for as we are beneficent and liberal, not to exact favor in return (for we are not usurers in kind actions), but by nature are inclined to liberality, thus I think that friendship is to be desired, not attracted by the hope of reward, but because the whole of its profit consists in love only. From such opinions, they who, after the fashion of beasts, refer everything to pleasure, widely differ: and no great wonder, since they cannot look up to any thing lofty, magnificent, or divine, who cast all their thoughts on an object so mean and contemptible. Therefore let us exclude such persons altogether from our discourse; and let us ourselves hold this opinion, that the sentiment of loving, and the attachment of kind feelings, are produced by nature, when the evidence of virtue has been established; and they who have eagerly sought the latter, draw nigh and attach themselves to it, that they may enjoy

the friendship and character of the individual they have begun to love, and that they may be commensurate and equal in affection, and more inclined to confer a favor than to claim any return. And let this honorable struggle be maintained between them: so not only will the greatest advantages be derived from friendship, but its origin from nature rather than from a sense of weakness, will be at once more impressive and more true. For if it were expediency that cemented friendships, the same when changed would dissolve them; but because nature can never change, therefore true friendships are eternal. Thus you see the origin of friendship, unless you wish to make some reply to these views.

FANNIUS. Nay, go on, Lælius, for I answer for Scævola here (who is my junior) on my own authority.

SCÆVOLA. You do right; wherefore let us attend.

LÆLIUS. Listen, then, my excellent friends, to the discussion which was very frequently held by me and Scipio on the subject of friendship; although he indeed used to say that nothing was more difficult than that friendship should continue to the end of life; for it often happened, either that the same course was not expedient to both parties, or that they held different views of politics: he also remarked that the characters of men often changed; in some cases by adversity, in others by old age becoming oppressive; and he derived an authority for such notions from a comparison with early life, be-

cause the strongest attachments of boys are constantly laid aside with the *prætexta*; even if they should maintain it to manhood, yet sometimes it is broken off by rivalry, for a dowried wife, or some other advantage, which they cannot both attain. And even if men should be carried on still further in their friendship, yet that feeling is often undermined, should they fall into rivalry for preferments; for there is no greater enemy to friendship than covetousness of money, in most men, and even in the best, an emulous desire of high offices and glory; in consequence of which the most bitter enmities have often arisen between the dearest friends. For great dissensions, and those in most instances, justifiable, arise, when some request is made of friends which is improper; as, for instance, that they should become either the ministers of their lust or their supporters in the perpetration of wrong; and they who refuse to do so, it matters not however virtuously, yet are accused of discarding the claims of friendship by those persons whom they are unwilling to oblige; but they who dare to ask any thing of a friend, by their very request seem to imply that they would do any thing for the sake of that friend; by the complaining of such persons, not only are long-established intimacies put an end to, but endless animosities are engendered. All these many causes, like so many fatalities, are ever threatening friendship, so



that he said, to escape them all, seemed to him a proof not merely of wisdom, but even of good fortune.

Wherefore let us first consider if you please, how far love ought to proceed in friendship. If Coriolanus had friends, were they bound to carry arms against their country with Coriolanus? Were their friends bound to support Viscellinus or Spurius Mælius when they aimed at the sovereignty? Nay, in the case of Tiberius Gracchus, when disturbing the commonwealth, we saw him totally abandoned by Quintus Tubero, and other friends of his own standing. But in the case of Caius Blossius, of Cumæ, the friend of our family, Scævola, when he had come to me (then attending upon the consuls Lænas and Rupilius in their council) to sue for pardon, he brought forward his plea, that he esteemed Tiberius Gracchus so highly that he thought it his duty to do whatever he wished. So I said, "What, even if he wished you to set fire to the capitol?" "He never would have thought of that," he replied. "But if he had?" "Then I would have complied." You see what an abominable speech: and by Hercules, he did so, and even worse than he said; for he did not follow the mad schemes of Tiberius Gracchus, but in fact headed them, and did not act as the accomplice of his violence, but even as the captain. Therefore in consequence of such rashness, being terrified by a new prosecution, he fled precipitately into Asia, joined the enemy, and atoned

to the commonwealth by a punishment just and severe. It is no excuse therefore for a fault, that you committed it for a friend's sake; for since the belief in another's excellence was that which conciliated friendship, it is hard for friendship to continue when you have apostatized from virtue. Now if we shall lay it down as right, either to concede to friends whatever they wish, or to obtain from them whatever we wish, we must have indeed consummate wisdom, if such a course leads to no vice. But we are speaking of those friends who are before our eyes, whom we see around us, or else whom we know by report, and with whom every-day life is familiar; from that class we must take our instances, and above all, from those who make the nearest approaches to wisdom. We see that Papus Æmilius was the intimate friend of Caius Lucinus (so we have learned from our fathers); that they were twice consuls together, and colleagues in the censorship; and that at the same time Marcus Curius and Titus Coruncanius were most intimate with them and with each other, is a matter of history, and therefore we can not even suspect that any one of these ever asked his friend anything that was contrary to their honor, their oath, and the interest of the state: for what reason is there for making such a remark about men like them? I am convinced had any of them made the request he would not have obtained it, for they were men of the purest principle; be-

sides, it would be equally as wrong to agree to any such request when made, as to make it. And yet Caius Carbo and Caius Cato both took the part of Tiberius Gracchus, as did his brother Caius, at that time by no means an agitator, but now one of the most violent.

Let this law therefore be established in friendship, viz., that we should neither ask things that are improper nor grant them when asked; for it is a disgraceful apology, and by no means to be admitted, as well in the case of other offenses, as when any one avows he has acted against the state for the sake of a friend. For we are placed, O Fannius and Scævola, in such a position that we ought to see from a distance the future calamities of the commonwealth; for the practice of our ancestors has already in some respect swerved from its career and course. Tiberius Gracchus has endeavored to obtain the sovereignty, or rather he reigned for a few months. Had the Roman people ever heard or witnessed anything similar? Even after his death his friends and relations maintained his cause; and what malice they exercised against Publius Scipio I can not relate without tears; for, owing to the recent punishment of Tiberius Gracchus, we withstood Carbo by whatever means we could. And concerning the tribuneship of Caius Gracchus, what we have to expect I have no disposition to anticipate; still the movement is creeping on, and when once it has begun, it rushes with

increasing precipitation to destruction; for already you have seen, with regard to the ballot, what great mischief has been caused—first, by the Gabinian law, and two years after by the Cassian; for already I fancy I see the people separated from the senate, and the most important measures carried at the caprice of the mob; far more people will learn how such things may be done than how they may be resisted. Wherefore do I say this? Because without allies no one attempts any thing of the kind; therefore this should be pressed on all good men, that if inadvertently they should have fallen unawares into friendships of that character, they must think themselves bound in such a manner that they must not desert their friends when doing wrong in any important matter; at the same time, punishment should be enacted against the wicked; and not less severe for those who have followed another than for those who have been themselves the leaders of the wickedness. Who was more illustrious in Greece than Themistocles? Who more powerful? And when he, as general in the Persian war, had freed Greece from slavery, and through unpopularity had been driven into exile, he could not endure the injustice of his ungrateful country, which he ought to have borne. He acted the same part as Coriolanus had done among us twenty years before. No one was found to support these men against their country; accordingly, they both committed suicide.

Wherefore such a combination with wicked men not only must not be sheltered under the excuse of friendship, but should rather be visited with every kind of punishments; so that no one may think it permitted to him to follow a friend, even when waging war against his country. And as matters have begun to proceed, I know not whether that will not some day occur. To me, however, it is no less a cause of anxiety in what state the republic shall be after my death than in what state it is at this day.

Let this, therefore, be established as a primary law concerning friendship, that we expect from our friends only what is honorable, and for our friends' sake do what is honorable; that we should not wait till we are asked; that zeal be ever ready, and reluctance far from us; but that we take pleasure in freely giving our advice; that in our friendship the influence of our friends, when they give good advice, should have great weight; and that this be employed to admonish not only candidly, but even severely, if the case shall require, and that we give heed to it when so employed; for, as to certain persons, whom I understand to have been esteemed wise men in Greece, I am of opinion that some strange notions were entertained by them; but there is nothing which they do not follow up with too great subtlety; among the rest, that excessive friendships should be avoided, lest it should be necessary for one to feel anxiety for many;

that every one has enough, and more than enough, of his own affairs; that to be needlessly implicated in those of other people is vexatious; that it was most convenient to hold the reins of friendship as loose as possible, so as either to tighten or slacken them when you please: for they argue that the main point toward a happy life is freedom from care, which the mind can not enjoy if one man be, as it were, in travail for others. Nay, they tell us that some are accustomed to declare, still more unfeelingly (a topic which I have briefly touched upon just above), that friendships should be cultivated for the purpose of protection and assistance, and not for kind feeling or affection; and therefore the less a man possesses of independence and of strength, in the same degree he most earnestly desires friendships; that thence it arises that women seek the support of friendship more than men, and the poor more than the rich, and persons in distress rather than those who are considered prosperous. Admirable philosophy! for they seem to take away the sun from the world who withdraw friendship from life; for we receive nothing better from the immortal gods, nothing more delightful; for what is this freedom from care?—in appearances, indeed, flattering; but, in many cases in reality to be disdained. Nor is it reasonable to refuse to undertake any honorable matter or action lest you should be anxious, or to lay it aside when under-

taken; for if we fly from care, we must fly from virtue also; for it is impossible that she can, without some degree of distress, feel contempt and detestation for qualities opposed to herself; just as kind-heartedness for malice, temperance for profligacy, and bravery for cowardice. Accordingly, you see that upright men are most distressed by unjust actions; the brave with the cowardly; the virtuous with the profligate; and, therefore, this is the characteristic of a well-regulated mind, both to be well pleased with what is excellent, and to be distressed with what is contrary. Wherefore, if trouble of mind befall a wise man (and assuredly it will, unless we suppose that all humanity is extirpated from his mind), what reason is there why we should altogether remove friendship from life, lest because of it we should take upon ourselves some troubles? for what difference is there (setting the emotions of the mind aside), I do not say between a man and a beast, but between a man and a stone, or log, or anything of that kind? For they do not deserve to be listened to, who would have virtue to be callous, and made of iron, as it were; which indeed is, as in other matters, so in friendship also, tender and susceptible; so that friends are loosened, as it were, by happy events, and drawn together by distresses.

Wherefore the anxiety which has often to be felt for a friend, is not of such force that it should remove

friendship from the world, any more than that the virtues, because they bring with them certain cares and troubles, should therefore be discarded. For when it produces friendship (as I said above), should any indication of virtue shine forth, to which a congenial mind may attach and unite itself—when this happens, affection must necessarily arise. For what is so unmeaning as to take delight in many vain things, such as preferences, glory, magnificent buildings, clothing and adornment of the body; and not to take an extreme delight in a soul endued with virtue, in such a soul as can either love, or (so to speak) love in return? for there is nothing more delightful than the repayment of kindness, and the interchange of devotedness and good offices. Now, if we add this, which may with propriety be added, that there is nothing which so allures and draws any object to itself as congeniality does friendship; it will, of course, be admitted as true that the good must love the good, and unite them to themselves, just as if connected by relationship and nature; for nothing is more apt to seek and seize on its like than nature. Wherefore this certainly is clear, Fannius and Scævola, (in my opinion), that among the good a liking for the good is, as it were, inevitable; and this indeed is appointed by nature herself as the very fountain of friendship. But the same kind disposition belongs also to the multitude; for virtue is not inhuman, or cruel, or haughty, since



she is accustomed to protect even whole nations, and to adopt the best measures for their welfare, which assuredly she would not do did she shrink from the affection of the vulgar. And to myself, indeed, those who form friendships with a view to advantage, seem to do away with its most endearing bond; for it is not so much the advantage obtained through a friend as the mere love of that friend, which delights; and then only what has proceeded from a friend becomes delightful if it has proceeded from zealous affection; and that friendship should be cultivated from a sense of necessity, is so far from being the case that those who, being endowed with power and wealth, and especially with virtue (in which is the strongest support of friendship), have least need of another, are most liberal and generous. Yet I am not sure whether it is requisite that friends should never stand in any need; for wherein would any devotedness of mine to him have been exerted if Scipio had never stood in need of my advice or assistance at home or abroad? Wherefore friendship has not followed upon advantage, but advantage on friendship.

Persons, therefore, who are wallowing in indulgence, will not need to be listened to if ever they shall descant upon friendship, which they have known neither by experience nor by theory. For who is there, by the faith of gods and men, who would desire, on the condition of

his loving no one, and himself being loved by none, to roll in affluence, and live in a superfluity of all things? For this is the life of tyrants, in which undoubtedly there can be no confidence, no affection, no steady dependence on attachment; all is perpetually mistrust and disquietude—there is no room for friendship. For who can love either him whom he fears, or him by whom he thinks he himself is feared? Yet are they courted, solely in hypocrisy, for a time; because, if perchance (as it frequently happens) they have been brought low, then it is perceived how destitute they were of friends. And this, they say, Tarquin expressed; that when going into exile, he found out whom he had as faithful friends, and whom unfaithful ones, since then he could no longer show gratitude to either party; although I wonder that, with such haughtiness and impatience of temper, he could find one at all. And as the character of the individual whom I have mentioned could not obtain true friends, so the riches of many men of rank exclude all faithful friendship; for not only is fortune blind herself, but she commonly renders blind those whom she embraces. Accordingly, such persons are commonly puffed up with pride and insolence, nor can any thing be found more intolerable than a fortunate fool. And thus, indeed, one may observe, that those who before were of agreeable character, by military command, by preferment, by prosperity, are changed, and old friend-

ships are despised by them, and new ones cherished. For what can be more foolish than, when men are possessed of great influence by their wealth, power, and resources, to procure other things which are procured by money—horses, slaves, rich apparel, costly vases—and not to procure friends, the most valuable and fairest furniture of life, if I may so speak; for while they are procuring those things, they know not for whom they are procuring them, nor for whose sake they are laboring. For every one of these things belongs to him who is most powerful, whereas the possession of his friendships is preserved to every one steadfast and secure; so that if those things are preserved which are, as it were, the gifts of fortune, yet a life unadorned and abandoned by friends can not possibly be happy. But on this head enough.

But it is required to lay down what limits there are in friendship, and, as it were, what bounds of loving, concerning which I see three opinions held, of none of which I approve:—the first that we should be affected toward a friend in the same manner as toward ourselves; the second, that our good-will toward our friends should exactly and equally answer to their good-will toward us; the third, that at whatever value a man sets himself, at the same he should be estimated by his friends. To none of these three opinions do I entirely assent. For the first one is not true, that as a man feels toward him-

self so he should be disposed toward his friend. For how many things, which for our own sake we should never do, do we perform for the sake of our friends? To ask favors of unworthy persons, to supplicate them, to inveigh bitterly against any one, and to accuse him with great vehemence, which in our own cases cannot be done creditably, in the case of our friends are most honorably done; and there are many cases in which good men subtract many things from their own interests, or allow them to be subtracted, that their friends, rather than themselves, may enjoy them. The second opinion is that which limits friendship to an equality of kind actions and kind wishes; this is indeed to reduce friendship to figures too minutely and penuriously, so that there may be a balance of received and paid. True friendship seems to be far too rich and affluent for that, and not to observe, narrowly, lest it should pay more than it receives: nor need it be feared lest any thing should be lost or fall to the ground, or lest more than what is fair should be accumulated on the side of friendship. But the third limitation is most detestable, that at whatever value a man sets on himself, at that value he should be estimated by his friends; for often, in certain persons, either their spirit is too humble, or their hope of improving their condition too desponding; it is not, therefore, the part of a friend to be toward him what he is to himself; but rather to use every effort, and

to contrive to cheer the prostrate spirit of his friend, and to encourage better hopes and thoughts. Therefore, I must lay down some other limit of true friendship, as soon as I shall have stated what Scipio was accustomed, above all things, to reprehend. He used to declare that no speech could be found more hostile to friendship, than his who had said that a man ought so to love as if one day he would come to hate. Nor, indeed, could he be induced to believe that this, as was supposed, was said by Bias, who was considered one of the seven wise men; but that it was the opinion of some wicked or ambitious man, or one who sought to bring everything under his own power. For in what manner can any one be a friend to him to whom he thinks he may possibly become an enemy? Moreover it will follow that he desires and wishes his friend to do wrong as often as possible, that he may afford him, as it were, so many handles for reproach. And, again, at the right conduct and advantage of his friends he will necessarily be tormented, grieved; and jealous. Wherefore this precept, to whomsoever it belongs, is powerful only for the destruction of friendship. This, rather, should have been the precept, that we should employ such carefulness in forming our friendships, that we should not any time begin to love the man whom we could ever possibly hate. Moreover, if we have been but unfortunate in our selection, Scipio was of opinion that this should

be submitted to, rather than that a time of alienation should ever be contemplated.

I think, therefore, we must adopt these limitations, that when the character of friends is correct, then there should be a community between them of all things, of purpose and of will, without any exception; so that, even if by any chance it has happened that the less honorable wishes of our friends have to be forwarded, in which either their life is concerned, or their reputation, then you may decline a little from the straight path, provided only extreme infamy do not follow; for there is a point to which indulgence may be granted to friendship; yet reputation must not be disregarded; nor ought we to esteem the good-will of our fellow-countrymen as an engine of small value in the administration of the state, although to seek it by fawning and flattering is mean indeed; yet virtue, on which affection is consequent, should by no means be rejected. But frequently (for I return to Scipio, the whole of whose discourse was concerning friendship) he used to complain, that in all other things men were comparatively careful; so that every man could tell how many goats or how many sheep he possessed, yet how many friends he had he could not tell; and in procuring the former, men employed carefulness, while in selecting their friends they were negligent, nor had they, as it were, any signs or marks by which they determined who were suited for

friendship. The steadfast, then, and the steady, and the consistent, are to be selected, of which class of persons there is a great scarcity; and, in truth, it is difficult for any one to judge, unless after he is experienced. Now the trial must be made in actual friendship; thus friendship outstrips judgment, and removes the power of making experiments. It is the part, therefore, of a prudent man, to check the impetus of his kindly feeling as he would his chariot, that we may have our friendships, like our horses, fully proved, when the character of our friends has been in some measure tested. Of some, it is often discovered in small sums of money how void of worth they are. Some, whom a small sum of money could not influence, are discovered in the case of a large one. But, even if some shall be found who think it sordid to prefer money to friendship, where should we find those who do not place above friendship high dignities, magistracies, military command, civil authorities and influence? so that, when on the one side these objects have been proposed, and the claim of friendship on the other, they would not far prefer the former. For nature is too weak to despise the possession of power; for, even if they have attained it by the slighting of friendship, they think the act will be thrown into the shade, because friendship was not overlooked without strong grounds. Therefore real friendships are found with

most difficulty among those who are invested with high offices, or in business of the state. For where can you find the man who would prefer his friend's advancement to his own? And why? For to pass over these matters, how grievous, how impracticable to most men, does participation in afflictions appear! to which it is not easy to find the man who will descend. Although Ennius truly says, "A sure friend is discerned in an unsure matter," yet these two charges of inconstancy and of weakness condemn most men; either in their prosperity they despise a friend, or in his troubles they desert him.

He who, therefore, shall have shown himself in both cases as regards friendship, worthy, consistent and steadfast, such a one we ought to esteem of a class of persons extremely rare, nay, almost godlike. Now, the foundation of that steadfastness and constancy, which we seek in friendship, is sincerity. For nothing is steadfast which is insincere. Besides, it is right that one should be chosen who is frank and good-natured, and congenial in his sentiments; one, in fact, who is influenced by the same motives; all which qualities have a tendency to create sincerity. For it is impossible for a wily and tortuous disposition to be sincere. Nor in truth can the man who has no sympathy from nature, and who is not moved by the same considerations, be either attached or steady. To the same requi-



sites must be added that he shall neither take delight in bringing forward charges, nor believe them when they arise; all which causes belong to that consistent principle, of which now for some time I have been treating. Thus the remark is true which I made at first, that friendship can only exist among the good; for it is the part of a good man (whom at the same time we may call a wise man), to observe these two rules in friendship: first, that there shall be nothing pretended or simulated (for even to hate openly better becomes the ingenuous man than by his looks to conceal his sentiments); in the next place, that not only does he repel charges when brought (against his friends) by any one, but is not himself suspicious, ever fancying that some infidelity has been committed by his friend. To all this there should be added a certain suavity of conversation and manners, affording, as it does, no inconsiderable zest to friendship. Now solemnity and gravity on all occasions, certainly, carry with them dignity; but friendship ought to be easier and more free and more pleasant, and tending more to every kind of politeness and good nature.

But there arises on this subject a somewhat difficult question; whether ever new friends, if deserving friendship, are to be preferred to old ones, just as we are wont to prefer young colts to old horses? a perplexity unworthy of a man; for there ought to be no satiety of

friendship as of other things; everything which is oldest (as those wines which bear age well) ought to be sweetest; and that is true which is sometimes said, "many bushels of salt must be eaten together," before the duty of friendship can be fulfilled. But new friendships, if they afford a hope that, as in the case of plants which never disappoint, fruits shall appear, such are not to be rejected; yet the old one must be preserved in its proper place, for the power of age and custom is exceedingly great; besides, in the very case of the horse, which I just mentioned, if there is no impediment, there is no one who does not more pleasurably use that to which he is accustomed than one unbroken and strange to him; and habit asserts its power, and habit prevails, not only in the case of this, which is animate, but also in the cases of those things which are inanimate, since we take delight in the very mountainous or woody scenery among which we have long dwelt. But it is of the greatest importance in friendship that the superior should be on an equality with the inferior. For there often are instances of superiority, as was the case with Scipio, one, so to speak, of our own herd. He never ranked himself above Philus, or Rupilius, or Mummius, or other friends of an inferior grade. But his brother, Quintus Maximus, a distinguished man, though by no means equal to himself, simply because he was the elder, he treated as his superior, and he

wished all his friends should receive additional dignity through him. And this conduct should be adopted and imitated by all, so that if they have attained to any excellence in worth, genius or fortune, they should communicate them with their friends, and share them with their connections; so that if men have been born of humble parentage, or if they have kinsmen less powerful than themselves, either in mind or in fortune, they should increase the consequence of such persons, and be to them a source of credit and of dignity; as in works of fiction, they who for some time, through ignorance of their origin and descent, have been in a state of servitude, when they have been discovered and found out to be the sons of gods or kings, yet retain their affection for the shepherds, whom for many years they looked upon as their parents. And this assuredly is much rather to be observed in the case of parents that are real and undoubted. For the fruit of talent, and worth, and every excellence, is gathered most fully when it is bestowed on every one most nearly connected with us.

As therefore those who are superior in the connection of friendship and of union ought to put themselves on a level with their inferiors, so ought the inferiors not to grieve that they are surpassed by their friends, either in genius, or fortune, or rank; whereas most of them are always either complaining of something, or even

breaking out into reproaches; and so much the more if they think they have any thing which they can say was done by them in an obliging and friendly manner with some exertion on their part. A disgusting set of people assuredly they are who are ever reproaching you with their services; which the man on whom they are conferred ought indeed to remember, but he who conferred them ought not to call them to mind. Wherefore, as those who are superior ought in the exercise of friendship to condescend, so, in a measure, they ought to raise up their inferiors. For there are some persons who render friendships with them annoying, while they fancy they are slighted; this does not commonly happen except to those who think themselves liable to be slighted; and from this belief they require to be relieved, not only by your professions, but by your actions. Now, first of all, so much advantage is to be bestowed on each as you yourself can produce; and in the next place, as much as he whom you love and assist can bear; for you could not, however eminent you might be, bring all your friends to the very highest honor; just as Scipio had power to make Publius Rutilus consul, but could not do the same for his brother Lucius; indeed, even if you have the power to confer what you please on another, yet you must consider what he can bear. On the whole, those connections only can be considered as friendships, when both the dis-

positions and age have been established and matured. Nor, when persons have been in early life attached to hunting or tennis, are they bound to make intimates of those whom at that time they loved, as being endowed with the same taste: for on that principle, our nurses and the tutors of our childhood, by right of priority, will claim the greatest part of our affection; who, indeed, should not be neglected, but possess our regard in some other manner: otherwise friendships could not continue steadfast. For dissimilar habits and dissimilar pursuits ensue; the dissimilarity of which severs friendships: it is for no other cause that the good can not be friends of the worthless, or the worthless of the good; but that there is between them the greatest difference that can subsist of characters and pursuits. For in friendships this precept may be properly laid down, not to let ill-regulated affection (as often is the case) thwart and impede the great usefulness of friends; nor in truth (to revert to fiction), could Neoptolemus have taken Troy if he had been inclined to listen to Lycomedes, with whom he had been brought up, when with many tears he sought to prevent his journey: and often important occasions arise, so that you must bid farewell to your friends; and he who would hinder them, because he can not easily bear the regret for their loss, such an one is both weak and effeminate by nature, and on that ground unjust in his friendship.

And in every case it is necessary to consider, both what you would ask of a friend, and what favor you would permit to be obtained from yourself.

There is a kind of calamity also, sometimes inevitable, in the discarding of friendships. For at length our discourse descends, from the intimacies of the wise, to ordinary friendships. The faults of friends often break out as well on the friends themselves as on strangers; and yet the disgrace of such persons must redound to their friends: such friendships therefore must be dissolved by the intermission of intercourse, and (as I have heard Cato say) should be ripped rather than rent; unless some intolerable sense of wrong has been kindled, so that it is neither right, nor creditable, nor possible that an estrangement and separation should not take place immediately. But if any change of character or pursuits (as commonly happens) shall have taken place, or quarrel arisen with respect to political parties (for I speak now, as I observed a little before, not of the friendships of the wise but of such as are ordinary), we should have to be cautious, lest not only friendships be found to be laid aside, but even animosity to have been incurred; for nothing can be more disgraceful than to be at war with him with whom you have lived on terms of friendship. From his friendship with Quintus Pompey, Scipio had withdrawn himself on my account (as you know); moreover, on account of the dissension

which existed in the republic, he was estranged from my colleague Metellus; on both occasions he acted with dignity and decision, and with an offended but not bitter feeling. Wherefore, in the first place, pains must be taken that there be no alienation of friends; but if aught of the kind shall have occurred, that that friendship should seem rather to have died away than to have been violently destroyed. In truth we must take care lest friendship turn into bitter hostilities; from which quarrels, hard language, and insults are produced, and yet if they shall be bearable, they must be borne; and thus much honor should be paid to an old friendship, that he shall be in fault who inflicts the injury, and not he who suffers it. On the whole, against all such faults and inconveniences there is one precaution and one provision, that we should not begin to love too hastily, nor love unworthy persons. Now they are worthy of friendship in whom there exists a reason why they should be loved; a rare class (for in truth all that is excellent is rare), nor is aught more difficult than to find any thing which in every respect is perfect of its kind: but most men recognize nothing as good in human affairs but what is profitable; and with their friends as with cattle, they love those most especially from whom they hope they will receive most advantage; and thus they are destitute of that most beautiful and most natural friendship, which is desirable for itself and of itself; nor do they

exemplify to themselves what and how powerful this quality of friendship is. For every one loves himself, not that he may exact from himself some reward of his affection, but that, for his own sake, every one is dear to himself. And unless this same principle be transferred to friendship, a true friend will never be found; for such an one is, as it were, a second self. Now, if this is apparent in beasts, birds, fishes, creatures of the field, tame and wild, that first they love themselves (for the principle is alike born with every living thing); in the next place that they seek out and desire some creatures of the same species to which they may unite themselves, and do this with desire, and with a kind of resemblance to human love; how much more naturally does this take place in man by nature, who not only loves himself, but seeks for another whose soul he may so mingle with his own, as almost to create one person out of two?

Yet most men, perversely, not to say shamelessly, desire to have a friend, such as they themselves are unable to be: and allowances which they themselves make not for their friends, they require from them. Now, the fair thing is, first that a man himself should be good, and then that he should seek another like to himself. Among such persons, there may be established that solidity of friendship which I have long been treating on; when men are united by benevolent feeling, they will first of all master those passions to which others



are slaves; next, they will take pleasure in equity and justice, and the one will undertake every thing for the other; nor will the one ever ask of the other any thing but what is honorable and right: nor will they only mutually regard and love each other, but even have a feeling of respect; for he removes the greatest ornament of friendship who takes away from it respect. Accordingly, there is a pernicious error in those who think that a free indulgence in all lusts and sins is extended in friendship. Friendship was given us by nature as the handmaid of virtues, and not as the companion of our vices: that since, alone and unaided, virtue could not arrive at the highest attainments, she might be able to do so when united and associated with another; and if such a society between any persons either exists or has existed, or is likely to do so, their companionship is to be esteemed, in respect of the chief good in life, most excellent and most happy. This, I say, is that association in which all things exist which men deem worthy the pursuit—reputation, high esteem, peace of mind, and cheerfulness; so that where these blessings are present, life is happy, and without these can not be so. And whereas this is the best and highest of objects, if we would gain it, attention must be paid to virtue; without which we can neither obtain friendship nor any thing worthy of pursuit: indeed, should this be disregarded, they who think they possess friends, too late find that they are

mistaken, when some grievous misfortune compels them to make the trial. Wherefore (for I must say it again and again) when you have formed your judgment, then it behooves you to give your affections; and not when you have given your affections, then to form the judgment; but while in many cases we suffer for our carelessness, so especially in choosing and cultivating friends; for we adopt a preposterous plan, and set about doing what has been already done, which we are forbidden by the old proverb to do. For, being entangled on every side, either by daily intercourse or else by kind offices, suddenly, in the middle of our course, on some offense arising, we break off our friendships altogether.

Wherefore so much the more is this great negligence to be blamed in a matter of the highest necessity. For friendship is the only point in human affairs, concerning the benefit of which all with one voice agree; although by many virtue herself is despised, and is said to be a mere bragging and ostentation. Many persons despise riches; for, being content with a little, moderate food and a moderate style of living delights them; as to high offices, in truth, with the ambitious desire of which some men are inflamed, how many men so completely disregard them that they think nothing is more vain and more trifling; and likewise there are those who reckon as nothing other things which to some men seem worthy of admiration; con-

cerning friendship, all to a man have the same opinion. Those who have devoted themselves to political affairs, and those who find pleasure in knowledge and learning, and those who transact their own affairs at their leisure, and lastly, those who have given themselves wholly up to pleasure, feel that without friendship life is nothing, at least if they are inclined in any degree to live respectably; for somehow or other, friendship entwines itself with the life of all men, nor does it suffer any mode of spending our life to be independent of itself. Moreover, if there is any one of such ferocity and brutality of nature that he shuns and hates the intercourse of mankind, such as we have heard that one Timon was at Athens; yet even he can not possibly help looking out for some one on whom he may disgorge the venom of his ill-nature. And this would be most clearly decided if something of this kind could happen—that some god should remove us from the crowded society of men, and place us somewhere in solitude, and there supplying us with abundance and plenty of all things which nature requires, yet should take from us altogether the opportunity of seeing a human being, who would then be so insensible that he could endure such a life, and from whom would not solitude take away the enjoyment of all pleasure? Accordingly, there is truth in that which I have heard our old men relate to have been commonly said by Archytas of Tarentum, and I

think heard by them from others their elders, that if any one could have ascended to the sky and surveyed the structure of the universe, and the beauty of the stars, that such admiration would be insipid to him; and yet it would be most delightful if he had some one to whom he might describe it. Thus nature loves nothing solitary, and always reaches out to something as a support, which ever in the sincerest friend is most delightful.

But while nature declares by so many indications what she likes, seeks after, and requires, yet we turn, I know not how, a deaf ear, nor do we listen to those admonitions which we receive from her. For the intercourse of friendship is various and manifold, and many occasions are presented of suspicion and offense, which it is the part of a wise man sometimes to wink at, sometimes to make light of, or at others to endure. This one ground of offense must be mitigated in order that truth and sincerity in friendship may be preserved; for friends require to be advised and to be reprov'd; and such treatment ought to be taken in a friendly spirit when it is kindly meant. But somehow or other it is very true what my dear friend Terence says in his *Andria*: "Complaisance begets friends, but truth ill-will." Truth is grievous, if indeed ill-will arises from it, which is the bane of friendship. But complaisance is much more grievous, because it allows a friend to be precipitated into ruin by yielding to his faults. But

the greatest of all faults is chargeable on him who disregards truth, and thus by complaisance is led into dishonesty. Accordingly, in managing this whole matter, carefulness and diligence must be employed; first, that our advice may be free from bitterness, and next, that reproof may be unattended by insult; in our complaisance, however (since I gladly adopt the saying of Terence), let there be a kindness of manner, let flattery, however, the handmaid of vices, be far removed, since it is not only unworthy of a friend, but even of a free man; for you live after one fashion with a tyrant, after another with a friend. Now where a man's ears are shut against the truth, so that he can not hear the truth from a friend, the welfare of such a one is to be despaired of; for the following remark of Cato is shrewd, as many of his are, "that bitter enemies deserve better at the hands of some than those friends who seem agreeable; that the former often speak the truth, the latter never." And it is an absurd thing that those who receive advice do not experience that annoyance which they ought to feel, but feel that from which they ought to be free; for they are not distressed because they have done wrong, but take it amiss that they are rebuked; whereas, on the contrary, they ought to be sorry for their misconduct, and to be glad at its correction.

As, therefore, both to give and to receive advice is

the characteristic of true friendship, and that the one should perform his part with freedom but not harshly, and the other should receive it patiently and not with recrimination; so it should be considered that there is no greater bane to friendship than adulation, fawning, and flattery. For this vice should be branded under as many names as possible, being that of worthless and designing men, who say every thing with a view of pleasing, and nothing with regard to truth. Now while hypocrisy in all things is blamable (for it does away with all judgment of truth, and adulterates truth itself), so especially is it repugnant to friendship, for it destroys all truth, without which the name of friendship can avail nothing. For since the power of friendship consists in this, that one soul is as it were made of many, how could that take place if there should not be in any one a soul, one and the same always, but fickle, changeable, and manifold? For what can be so pliant, so inconsistent, as the soul of that man, who veers not only to the feelings and wishes, but even to the look and very nod of another. "Does any one say, 'No?' so do I; says any, 'Yes?' so do I: in a word, I have charged myself to assent to every thing," as the same Terence says; but he speaks in the character of Gnatho, and to select a friend of this character is an act of downright folly. And there are many like Gnatho, though his superiors in rank, fortune, and character; the flattery of such

people is offensive indeed, since respectability is associated with duplicity. Now a fawning friend may be distinguished from a true one, and discerned by the employment of diligence, just as every thing which is falsely colored and counterfeit, from what is genuine and true. The assembly of the people, which consists of the most ignorant persons, yet can decide what difference there is between the seeker after popular applause, the flatterer and the worthless citizen, and one who is consistent, dignified, and worthy. With what flatteries did Curius Papirius lately insinuate himself into the ears of the assembly, when he sought to pass an act to reelect the tribunes of the people? I opposed it. But I say nothing of myself; I speak with greater pleasure concerning Scipio. O immortal gods! what dignity was his! what majesty in his speech! so that you might readily pronounce him the leader of the Roman people, and not their associate: but you were present, and the speech is still extant: accordingly this act, meant to please the people, was rejected by the votes of the people. But, to return to myself, you remember when Quintus Maximus, brother of Scipio, and Lucius Mancius were consuls, how popular the sacredotal act of Caius Licinius Crassus seemed to be; for the election of the college was thereby transferred to the presentation of the people. And he first commenced the practice of turning toward the forum, and addressing the people. And yet regard

for the immortal gods, under my advocacy, gained an easy triumph over his plausible address. Now this occurred in my prætorship, five years before I was consul; so that that cause was supported rather by its own importance than by supreme influence.

Now, if upon the stage, that is, before the assembly, where every advantage is given to fictions and imitations, yet the truth prevails (if only it be set forth and illustrated), what ought to be the case in friendship, which is measured according to simple truth? for in it (as the saying is) ye see an open heart and show your own also; you can have nothing faithful, nothing certain; and you can not love or be loved, since you are uncertain how far it is sincerely done. And yet that flattery, however pernicious it be, can hurt no one but the man who receives it, and is most delighted with himself. Hence it happens that he opens his ears widest to flatteries who is a flatterer of himself, and takes the highest delight in himself: no doubt virtue loves herself, for she is best acquainted with herself, and is conscious how amiable she is: but I am not speaking of virtue, but of a conceit of virtue; for not so many desire to be endowed with virtue itself, as to seem to be so. Flattery delights such men: when conversation formed to their wishes is addressed to such persons, they think those deceitful addresses to be the evidence of their merits. This, therefore, is not friendship at all, when one party is unwill-



ing to hear the truth, and the other prepared to speak falsely. Nor would the flattery of parasites in comedies seem to us facetious, unless there were swaggering soldiers also. "Does then Thais pay me many thanks? It was enough to answer 'yes, many;' but he says 'infinite.'" The flatterer always exaggerates that which he, for whose pleasure he speaks, wishes to be great. Although the flattering falsehood may have influence with those who themselves allure and invite it; yet more steady and consistent persons require to be warned that they take care lest they are entrapped by such crafty flattery; for every one, except the man who is extremely obtuse, observes the person who openly employs adulation. But lest the crafty and insidious man should insinuate himself, you must be studiously on your guard; for he is not very easily recognized; seeing that he often flatters by opposing; and pretending that he quarrels, is fawning all the time, and at last surrenders himself, and allows himself to be beaten; so that he who has been deluded may fancy that he has seen further than the other; for what can be more disgraceful than to be deluded? And, lest this happen, we must be more cautious, as it is said in the *Epiclerus*, "To-day, above all the foolish old fellows of the comedy, you will have deceived me and played upon me in a most amusing manner." For this is the most foolish character of all in the plays, that of unthinking and credulous old men. But I know not

how it is that my address, passing from the friendship of perfect men, that is of the wise (for I speak of that wisdom which seems within the reach of man), has digressed into frivolous friendships. Wherefore, let me return to that from which I set out, and bring these remarks at length to a conclusion.

It is virtue, virtue I say, Caius Fannius, and you, Quintus Mucius, that both wins friendship and preserves it; for in it is found the power of adapting one's self to circumstances, and also steadfastness and consistency; and when she has exalted herself and displayed her own effulgence, and hath beheld the same and recognized it in another, she moves toward it, and in her turn receives that which is in the other; from which is kindled love or friendship, for both derive their name from loving; for to love is nothing else than to be attached to the person whom you love, without any sense of want, without any advantage being sought; and yet advantage springs up of itself from friendship, even though you may not have pursued it. It was with kind feelings of this description that I, when young, was attached to those old men, Lucius Paullus, Marcus Cato, Caius Gallus, Publius Nasica, and Tiberius Gracchus, the father-in-law of our friend Scipio. This is even more strikingly obvious between persons of the same age as between me and Scipio, Lucius Furius, Publius Rupilius and Spurius Mummius; and now in turn, in my old age,

I repose in the attachment of younger men, as in yours and that of Quintus Tubero; nay, I even take delight in the familiarity of some that are very young, of Publius Rutilius and Aulus Virginius. And since the course of our life and nature is so directed that a new period is ever arising, it is especially to be wished that with those comrades with whom you set out, as it were, from the starting, with the same you may, as they say, arrive at the goal. But since human affairs are frail and fleeting, some persons must ever be sought for whom we may love, and by whom we may be loved; for when affection and kind feeling are done away with, all cheerfulness likewise is banished from existence. To me, indeed, though he was suddenly snatched away, Scipio still lives, and will always live; for I love the virtue of that man, and that worth is not yet extinguished; and not before my eyes only is it presented, who ever had it in possession, but even with posterity it will be illustrious and renowned; for never shall any undertake any high achievements with spirit and hope, without feeling that the memory and the character of that man should be placed before him. Assuredly, of all things that either fortune or nature has bestowed on me, I have none which I can compare with the friendship of Scipio. In it I had concurrence in politics, and in it advice for my private affairs. In it, also, I possessed a repose replete with pleasure. Never in the slightest degree did I of-

fend him, at least so far as I was aware; never did I myself hear a word from him that I was unwilling to hear; we had one house between us, the same food, and that common to both; and not only service abroad, but even our traveling and visits to the country were in common. For what need I say of our constant pursuits of knowledge and learning, in which, retired from the eyes of the world, we spent all our leisure time? Now, if the recollection and memory of these things had died along with him, I could in no wise have borne the loss of that most intimate and affectionate friend; but these things have not perished, yea, they are rather cherished and improved by reflection and memory; and even if I were altogether bereft of them, yet would age itself bring me much comfort, for I can not now very long suffer these regrets. Now all afflictions, if brief, ought to be tolerable, howsoever great they may be. Such are the remarks I had to make on friendship. But as for you, I exhort you to lay the foundations of virtue, without which friendship can not exist, in such a manner that, with this one exception, you may consider that nothing in the world is more excellent than friendship.

## TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION.

### SOURCES OF FRIENDSHIP.

1. Reverence for what is noble and great in the character of another.

2. Need of those elements of character which are possessed by one and not by the other, viz., differences of quality.

3. Similarities of character—that condition of soul which permits one to tell the truth because he is understood.

How many examples can you name of friendships which have become historical because of the greatness of the persons interested? From which of the sources enumerated above have those friendships sprung?

Are friends chosen by chance, or by the natures of the persons who become friends? Why are some friendships of longer duration than others?

Show how the German proverb:

“Getheilte Freude, doppelte Freude;  
Getheilter Schmerz, halber Schmerz.”  
(Joy shared is Joy doubled;  
Pain shared is Pain halved.)

is true, as regards Friendship. Bacon says: “The parable of Pythagoras is dark but true: *Cor ne edito* (Eat not the heart). Certainly, if a man would give it a hard phrase, those that want friends to open themselves unto are cannibals of their own hearts. But one thing is admirable, which is, that this communicating of a man’s self to his friend works two contrary effects; for it redoubleth joys and cutteth griefs in halves.”

Name some of the qualities you think necessary for friendship. What qualities are considered by Cicero as essential to friendship? Is there a difference between the elements of a brief and temporary friendship and one that lasts for many years? What is meant by the proverb concerning "many bushels of salt" on page 44? Aristotle quotes it as a proverbial saying, so that it is of great antiquity.

The historian Paternulus says of Cicero, that only in Cicero's lifetime was there any great eloquence in Rome.

What other orators lived in Rome in Cicero's time?

What were the conditions of life in Rome in regard to liberty and religion which caused orators to appear?

"The great ideas that suddenly expand the mind of man indicate themselves by orators"—Show how this was exemplified in the days of Cicero.

## BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY.

**Aemilius Papus**, or *Ælius Pætus*, the most distinguished jurist of his time, named *Catus* from his acuteness. (B. C. 198).

**Africanus**, a surname given to the Scipios, on account of their victories in Africa. The one meant in the text was the younger son of L. *Æmilius Paulus*, the conqueror of Macedonia, and was adopted by *Publius Scipio*, son of the conqueror of *Hannibal*. In his seventeenth year he accompanied his father, *Paulus*, to Greece, and fought under him at the battle of *Pydna*, 168 B. C. *Scipio* devoted himself with ardor to the study of literature, and formed an intimate relationship with *Polybius* and *Panaetius*. The poets *Lucilius* and *Terence* were his friends. His friendship with *Laelius* has been immortalized by *Cicero's* essay, the full title being "*Laelius, sive de Amicitia.*" Although thus devoted to the study of polite literature, *Scipio* is said to have cultivated the virtues which distinguished the older Romans, and to have made *Cato* the model of his conduct. By his personal bravery and military skill, he gained great renown in Africa and at home. When he returned to Rome to become a candidate for the aedileship in 147 he was elected consul, although he was only thirty-seven, the age required for candidates to the consulship being forty-three. The senate assigned to him Africa as his province. He prosecuted the siege of *Carthage* with the utmost vigor, and captured the city in 146. After reducing Africa to the form of a Roman province, *Scipio* returned to Rome. The surname of *Africanus* which he had inherited by adoption from the conqueror of *Hannibal*, he had now acquired for himself by his own exploits. The long continuance of the war in Spain again called *Scipio* to the consulship. Spain was assigned to him, and his work there met with success. He brought the war to a close by the capture of the city of *Numantia*, after a long siege. During his absence in Spain *Tiberius Gracchus* had been put to death. Upon his return he opposed the popular party, and tried to prevent the agrarian law of *T. Gracchus* from being carried into effect. In the disputes that arose in con-

sequence he was accused by Carbo as an enemy of the people. He went home in the evening intending to compose a speech for the following day, but in the morning he was found dead in his bed. He is supposed to have been murdered.

Scipio's own mother, the wife of Paulus Æmilius, was divorced for no assignable reason, and was left very poor. Her son, on the death of the widow of his adopted father, gave her the entire estate that then came into his possession. After his mother's death, law and custom authorized him to resume what he had given her: but he then gave it to his sisters. The conversation which Cicero mentions as held with Scipio is "De Senectute." See page 11.

**Agrigentum**, "a certain learned man of Agrigentum," was Empedocles, who lived about 444 B. C. He was a learned and eloquent philosopher who excelled also in medicine and poetry. He taught the Hindoo belief that the soul has been banished into the body to punish it, and that it migrates through animal and vegetable bodies until it shall be entirely purified. His works were all in verse, and some fragments have come down to us. Empedocles was chosen as a model by Lucretius.

**Andria**, a play of Terence, who was a native of Carthage, and sold as a slave to Terentius Lucanus, a Roman senator. He was on terms of intimacy with Scipio, the elder Africanus and Laelius. He is said to have translated one hundred and three of the comedies of the poet Menander, six only of which are extant. He died about B. C. 159.

**Apollo**, oracle of—See Socrates.

**Archytas**, of Tarentum, a Pythagorean philosopher, an able astronomer and geometrician. He was contemporary with Plato, whose life he is said to have saved by his influence with the tyrant Dionysius. He lived about 400 B. C.

**Atilius Lucius**, surnamed Sapiens, a Roman jurist who lived about 180 B. C. He was one of the earliest of the juriconsuls who took pupils.

**Atticus**, a Roman philosopher and scholar celebrated for his



benevolence, moderation and fine literary taste. He was born in 109 B. C. He was an intimate friend of Cicero, with whom he corresponded regularly for many years, and was on friendly terms with Cæsar, Pompey, Brutus, Mark Antony and Augustus. When Brutus was forced to fly from Italy, Atticus sent him \$40,000. He also gave relief to the wife of Antony in her adversity. He devoted his life for the most part to literature, adhering to a resolution formed in early life, never to accept public office. Atticus' real name was Pomponius. The name Atticus was due to his Greek culture and sympathies, and his long residence at Athens.

**Bias**, one of the "Seven Wise Men of Greece." See "Seven."

**Blossius Caius**, of Cumæ, was a philosopher, a disciple of Antipater of Tarsus, and friend of Tiberius Gracchus. He took refuge with Aristonicus, king of Pergamus, then at war with Rome; and when Aristonicus was conquered Blossius committed suicide.

**Brutus, Decius**, one of Cæsar's followers. He had been commander of his cavalry. He was one of the murderers of Cæsar although he had been a special favorite of that great general. He was slain by Camillus, a Gaul to whom he had fled for refuge, and whom he had formerly loaded with benefits. His head was sent to Antony.

**Carbo**, Caius Papirius, a distinguished orator, and a man of great talents, but of no principle. He was tribune of the people in the time of Tiberius Gracchus, who was his friend. But after the death of Caius Gracchus he deserted the popular party. He was the bitter enemy of Scipio and is supposed to have caused his death.

**Cassius Spurius Viscellinus**, who was thrice chosen consul, is distinguished as having carried the first agrarian law at Rome. This law brought upon him the enmity of his fellow-patricians; they accused him of aiming at regal power and put him to death in 485 B. C.

**Cato Major**. An essay written in defence of old age. It is

supposed to have been spoken by Marcus Porcius Cato—the “Elder,” or the “Censor,” who was born at Tusculum, of a plebeian family, B. C. 234. The Cato of the dialogue is mild-mannered, reflective, at home in philosophical literature, and even not disinclined to music, after the manner of Socrates. The real Cato was harsh in temper, narrow in prejudice, a shrewd hater of the elder Scipio, his rival, and of the whole party of refinement. Lahmeyer says of him, “He was a man of iron strength of body and mind, of antique sternness and firmness of character, of simplicity and thrift, of patriotism that was close to narrow bigotry, of strength of will and patient temper, of unwearied force of toil and thirst for knowledge, with a copious knowledge of law and a vigorous original eloquence, of bravery and generalship, of nervous activity in his province as husbandman and householder, as statesman and writer, with a high reputation for practical sagacity, commanding the unshaken regard of the people and the senate, in both public and private life, and all this to the end of his great old age.”

Cicero's essay on Old Age was written when he was more than sixty-two years old, and is addressed to his friend Atticus, who was five years older.

Plutarch, speaking of the death of Cato's eldest son, mention of which is made on page ten of the text, says, “It was said that he bore his loss moderately and like a philosopher, and was nothing remiss in attending to affairs of state.” The younger Cato was praetor at the time of his death, and had won fame as a soldier. •

**Coriolanus, Caius Marcius.** While the Romans were besieging Corioli, the Volsci made a sally, but were defeated. In the eagerness of the pursuit, Caius Marcius followed the enemy inside the gates, which were closed upon him. But with his good sword he hewed his way back, and let in the Romans. So the city was taken, and the hero received the name Coriolanus. Afterward there was a famine at Rome, and grain arriving from Sicily, Caius would not sell any to the plebeians unless they would submit to the patricians. Thereupon the tribunes tried

to bring him to trial, but he fled and took refuge among the Volsci. Soon after he returned at the head of a great army and laid siege to Rome. As a last resort, his mother, wife and children with many of the chief women, clad in deepest mourning, went forth and fell at his feet. Unable to resist their prayers, Coriolanus exclaimed, "Mother, thou hast saved Rome, but lost thy son." Having ordered the retreat, he is said to have been slain by the angry Volsci.

**Corucanius, Titus**, an eminent jurist and senator, was elected consul in 280 B. C., and pontifex maximus about 254 B. C. He was the first plebeian who attained the latter dignity, and he was the first person in Rome who gave regular instruction in law.

**Crassus, Licinius**, a Roman historian, leader of the popular party. His history of Rome, entitled "Annals," or "Rerum Romanorum Libri," is referred to with respect by Livy. He was impeached by Cicero. The measure proposed by Crassus was one by which the election of the augurs was given to the people and taken from the priests, hence a radical measure.

**Dentatus, Curius Marcus**, a favorite hero of the Roman republic, was celebrated in later times as a noble specimen of old Roman frugality and virtue. In his first consulship (B. C. 290) he successfully opposed the Samnites, and in his second he defeated Pyrrhus. At the close of his military career he retired to his small farm which he cultivated with his own hands. Once the Samnites sent an embassy to him with costly presents; they found him sitting on the hearth and roasting turnips. He rejected their presents, telling them he preferred ruling over those who possessed gold to possessing it himself. While he was censor he supplied Rome with water from the Anio by an aqueduct.

**Ennius**, a Roman epic poet, born of a Greek family about 239 B. C. In early life he became a citizen of Rome, where he obtained the friendship of Cato, Scipio and Cicero. His principal work, called the "Annals," a historical epic, was for a long time the most popular poem in the language. He is said to have first introduced the heroic hexameter verse from the Greek into Latin

poetry. His works are all lost except some fragments quoted by Cicero and others.

**Epiclerus**, a comedy by Caecilius Statius, a freedman of *Insubrian* birth, of whose writings only a few fragments remain.

**Fabius, Quintus**, eldest son of Paulus and adopted son of Fabius Maximus.

**Fabricius**, a Roman statesman, celebrated for his great integrity and simplicity of life. About 280 B. C. he was sent on an embassy to Pyrrhus, who was encamped with an army near Tarentum. His conduct on that occasion has furnished a theme for historians and poets. He refused the rich presents or bribes which Pyrrhus offered him.

**Fannius, Caius**, a Roman historian, who distinguished himself at the capture of Carthage, 146 B. C. He wrote a work on Roman history.

**Furius, Lucius Philo**, a man who was called a great friend of literature.

**Gabinian Law.**—*Lex Gabinia de Comitibus*, by Aulus Gabinus, the tribune. It required that in the public assemblies for electing magistrates, the votes should be given by tablets, and not *viva voce*. Cassius was tribune of the people, and competitor with Cicero for the consulship.

**Gallus**, an eminent astronomer.

**Gnatho**, a parasite in the play called *The Eunuch*, by the poet Terence.

**Gracchus, Caius**, brother of Tiberius, was tribune of the plebs in 123 B. C. His reforms were far more extensive than his brother's, and such was his influence with the people that he carried all he proposed. His first measure was the renewal of the agrarian laws of his brother. The senate, unable to resist the measures of Caius, caused the people to arise in a mob, and he was killed by a faithful slave to prevent his falling into the hands of his enemies.

**Gracchus, Tiberius**, grandson of the conqueror of Hannibal,

secured the passage of an agrarian law, which directed the public land to be assigned in small farms to the needy, so as to give every man a homestead, and he proposed to divide the treasures of Attalus among those who received land, in order to enable them to build houses and buy cattle. But the oligarchs aroused a mob by which Gracchus was assassinated.

**Graecia Magna**, the name given to a cluster of Greek colonies thickly scattered along the shore of Southern Italy.

**Hannibal**, a great Carthaginian leader, who in 218 B. C. invaded Italy. In the battle at Cannae, twenty-one tribunes, eighty senators, and over seventy thousand men of Rome fell. After the battle Hannibal sent to Carthage a bushel of gold rings, the ornaments of Roman knights. Publius Scipio carried the war against the Carthaginians into Africa, and Hannibal was defeated by him at Tama. Scipio received the name Africanus in honor of his triumph.

**Laelius, Caius**, surnamed Sapiens, was an eminent orator. He studied philosophy with Diogenes the Stoic. He served with distinction under his friend Scipio the younger at the siege of Carthage, and was consul in 140 B. C. He died about 115 B. C. The two names Scipio and Laelius are types of friendship, like Damon and Pythias, David and Jonathan, Pylades and Orestes, or Patroclus and Achilles.

**Laenas**, consul in 132 B. C., the year after the murder of T. Gracchus. He was charged by the victorious aristocratic party with the prosecution of the accomplices of Gracchus. He afterwards withdrew into voluntary exile from the vengeance of Caius Gracchus.

**Lucius**, the brother of Publius Rupilius, and not the brother of Scipio. See page 46.

**Lycomedes**, king of the Dolopians, in the island of Scyros, to whose court Achilles was sent disguised as a maiden by his mother, to prevent his going to the Trojan war. The daughter of Lycomedes was the mother of Neoptolemus and Achilles was his father.

**Maelius, Spurius**, a Roman knight who gained the favor of the people by the profuse use of his large fortune. He was accused of a design to make himself king, and was summoned before Cincinnatus, who was appointed dictator for the occasion. Refusing to submit, he was killed by Servilius Ahala in 439 B. C.

**Manilius**, a Roman tribune and partisan of Pompey. He proposed a bill called "Lex Manilia," granting to Pompey the command of the war against Mithridates in place of Lucullus. On this occasion Cicero uttered his celebrated oration, "Pro lege Manilia."

**Metellus**, praetor in 148 B. C., defeated the usurper Andronicus in Macedonia. Although the intimacy of Scipio and Metellus was suspended for political reasons, yet they held each other in high regard.

**Mucius, Quintus.** See Scaevola.

**Mummius**, defeated the Achaean league, established a Roman province in Greece, and was censor B. C. 132 with Scipio Africanus.

**Nasica**, leader of the senate in the murder of T. Gracchus. He became in consequence such an object of hatred to the people that he was sent to Asia, and after long wandering died at Pergamum.

**Neoptolemus**, a surname of Pyrrhus, the son of Achilles. He was so called because he came to the Trojan war in the last year of the siege of Troy. According to the fates, Troy could not be taken without his assistance. His mother was the daughter of Lycomedes, king of the island of Scyros.

**Orestes**, son of Agamemnon, slew his mother, Clytemnestra, and thus avenged his father's death, but though the guilt of his mother alleviated the revolting act, yet it did not fail to awaken great horror, and the Eumenides, avenging deities, seized upon Orestes, and drove him frantic from land to land. Pylades accompanied him in his wanderings, and watched over him. Orestes has been the subject of many Greek writings.

**Pacuvius, Marcus**, an eminent tragic poet and painter,

born at Brundisium about 220 B. C., was a nephew of the poet Ennius. According to the judgment of Quintilian and other ancient critics his dramas had some merit. His works are lost except small fragments,

**Papirius.** See Carbo.

**Paulus**, a consul B. C. 216, killed in the battle of Cannae, father of the victor of Pydna, and grandfather of the younger Africanus. Two younger sons died, the one aged twelve, five days before his father's triumph over Perseus, the other, aged fifteen, eight days afterwards. As his two elder sons had been adopted into the Fabian and Cornelian families, he left no descendants to bear his name.

**Philus** was an upright, impartial man. At the close of his consulship, he was sent to take command of the army against Numantia, and chose for his lieutenants Metellus and Pompeius, his bitter enemies, but the men best fitted for the service. B. C. 66.

**Pompeius, Quintus**, a Roman general and orator, was consul in 141 B. C. He commanded in Spain in 140 and was defeated. In 131 B. C. he was elected censor. Laelius intended to present himself as a candidate for the consulship. Pompeius was asked whether he would be a candidate, and when he replied that he would not, Scipio asked him to use his influence in behalf of Laelius. This Pompeius promised, and then instead of being true to his word, offered himself for the consulship, and was elected.

**Pylades**, son of Strophius, king of Phocis, was a cousin and intimate friend of Orestes, whose sister Electra he married. The friendship of Pylades and Orestes was proverbial.

**Pyrrhus**, king of Epirus, came to the help of Tarentum, a Greek city in Southern Italy, against Rome in 280 B. C. He brought twenty-five thousand soldiers and twenty elephants. For the first time the Roman legion met the Macedonian phalanx. Pyrrhus won at first, but was finally defeated. He offered Fabricius "more gold than Rome had ever possessed" if he would enter his service, but Fabricius replied that "Poverty with a

good name is better than wealth." Afterward the physician of Pyrrhus offered to poison the king. But the indignant Roman sent back the traitor in irons. Pyrrhus, not to be outdone in generosity, set free all his captives, saying, "It is easier to turn the sun from its course than Fabricius from the path of honor."

**Rupilius**, consul in 132 B. C., prosecuted with great energy all the adherents of T. Gracchus. He was condemned in the tribunate of C. Gracchus for his cruel and illegal acts in the prosecution of the friends of T. Gracchus.

**Scaevola, Q. Mucius**, a Roman consul, B. C. 117, surnamed the Augur. He was eminent as a jurist. His wife was daughter of Caius Laelius.

**Scaevola**, also Quintus Mucius, surnamed Pontifex, was son of Publius Mucius. He was chosen consul in 95 B. C., and was afterwards proconsul of Asia and pontifex maximus. He was a great jurist and orator. Having been proscribed by the younger Marius, he was killed in the temple of Vesta 82 B. C. Cicero gives us a picture of him elsewhere. "Though he did not undertake to give instruction to anyone, yet he practically taught those who were anxious to listen to him by allowing them to hear his answers to those who consulted him."

**Seven Wise Men** of Greece, lived about 600 B. C. They were Cleobulus, Chilo, Periander, Pittacus, Solon, Bias, Thales.

**Socrates**, the celebrated Athenian philosopher, born near Athens B. C. 469: He taught the unity of God, the immortality of the soul, the beauty and necessity of virtue and the moral responsibility of man. When the oracle of Apollo was consulted as to the wisest man, the reply was that there was no man wiser than Socrates.

**Sulpicius, Publius**, a Roman orator, born in 124 B. C., became tribune 88 B. C., and was an adherent of Marius in the civil war with Sulla. He was afterward betrayed into the hands of Sulla, and put to death.

**Tarquinius, Superbus** was the seventh and last king of Rome. He erected massive edifices, compelling the workmen to



receive such pitiable wages, that many in despair committed suicide. He was so tyrannical and unjust, that the people rose in indignation, and drove the Tarquins from the city. Henceforth the Romans hated the very name of king. Rome now became a free city after it had been governed by kings two hundred and forty years. The people chose for rulers two consuls, elected yearly.

**Terence**, the celebrated comic poet, was born at Carthage B. C. 195. He was the slave of Lucanus, a Roman senator, by whom he was afforded an education and finally freed. The *Andria* was the first play presented by him. Although a foreigner and a freedman he divides with Cicero and Cæsar the palm for pure Latinity.

**Thais**. The line quoted is from Terence's *Eunuch*.

**Themistocles**, a Grecian general associated with Miltiades at Marathon, was an able but often unscrupulous statesman. He urged the Athenians to build a fleet so that they could defeat the Persians. His ambition was to found a grand maritime empire, but his share in the treason of Pausanias having been discovered he was ostracized. He was welcomed by Artaxerxes, then king of Persia, and assigned the revenue of three cities. He lived like a prince, but finally ended his pitiable existence, it is said, with poison.

**Timon**, an Athenian, called the Misanthrope, from his hatred of society. He forms the subject of one of Shakespeare's plays, and of one of Lucian's dialogues.

**Tubero Quintus**, a Roman orator and jurist. He was a friend of Cicero and partisan of the senate and Pompey in the civil war.

**Viscellinus**. See Cassius Sp.



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
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